Securing Disaster in Haiti
by Peter Hallward
Nine days after the devastating earthquake that struck Haiti on 12 January 2010, it's now clearthat the initial phase of the U.S.-led relief operation has conformed to thethree fundamental tendencies that have shaped the more general course of theisland's recent history. It has adopted military priorities and strategies.It has sidelined Haiti's own leaders and government, and ignored theneeds of the majority of its people. And it has proceeded in ways thatreinforce the already harrowing gap between rich and poor. All threetendencies aren't just connected, they are mutually reinforcing. Thesesame tendencies will continue to govern the imminent reconstruction effort aswell, unless determined political action is taken to counteract them.
I
Haiti is not only one of the poorest countries in the world, it is also one of the most polarisedand unequal in its disparities in wealth and access to political power.1 A small clique of rich andwell-connected families continues to dominate the country and its economy whilemore than half the population, according to the IMF, survive on a householdincome of around 44 US pennies per day.2
Mass destitution has grown far more severe in recent decades. Starting in the 1970s,internationally imposed neo-liberal 'adjustments' and austerity measuresfinally succeeded in doing what no Haitian government had managed to do sincewinning independence in 1804: in order to set the country on the road towards'economic development', they have driven large numbers of small farmers off their land and into densely crowded urban slums. A small minority ofthese internal refugees may be lucky enough to find sweatshop jobs that pay thelowest wages in the region. These wages currently average $2 or $3 a day;in real terms they are worth less than a quarter of their 1980 value.
Haiti's tiny elite owes its privileges to exclusion, exploitation and violence, and it isonly violence that allows it to retain them. For much of the lastcentury, Haiti's military and paramilitary forces (with substantial amounts ofUS support) were able to preserve these privileges on their own. Over thecourse of the 1980s, however, it started to look as if local militaryrepression might no longer be up to the job. A massive and courageouspopular mobilisation (known as Lavalas) culminated in 1990 with the landslideelection of the liberation theologian Jean-Bertrand Aristide as president.Large numbers of ordinary people began to participate in the politicalsystem for the first time, and as political scientist Robert Fatton remembers,'panic seized the dominant class. It dreaded living in close proximity tola populace and barricaded itself against Lavalas.'3
Nine months later, the army dealt with this popular threat in the time-honoured way, with acoup d'état. Over the next three years, around 4,000 Aristide supporterswere killed.
However, when the US eventually allowed Aristide to return in October 1994, he took a surprisingand unprecedented step: he abolished the army that had deposed him. Ashuman rights lawyer Brian Concannon (director of the Institute for Justice andDemocracy in Haiti) observed a few years later, 'it is impossible tooverestimate the impact of this accomplishment. It has been called thegreatest human rights development in Haiti since emancipation, and is wildlypopular.'4 In 2000, the Haitian electorategave Aristide a second overwhelming mandate when his party (Fanmi Lavalas) wonmore than 90% of the seats in parliament.
II
More than anything else, what has happened in Haiti since 1990 should be understood asthe progressive clarification of this basic dichotomy -- democracy or the army.Unadulterated democracy might one day allow the interests of thenumerical majority to prevail, and thereby challenge the privileges of theelite. In 2000, such a challenge became a genuine possibility: theoverwhelming victory of Fanmi Lavalas, at all levels of government, raised theprospect of genuine political change in a context in which there was no obviousextra-political mechanism -- no army -- to prevent it.
In order to avoid this outcome, the main strategy of Haiti's little ruling class has been toredefine political questions in terms of 'stability' and 'security', and inparticular the security of property and investments. Mere numbers maywell win an election or sustain a popular movement but as everyone knows, onlyan army is equipped to deal with insecurity. The well-armed 'friend ofHaiti' that is the United States knows this better than anyone else.
As soon as Aristide was re-elected, a systematic international campaign to bankrupt anddestabilise his second government set the stage for a paramilitary insurrectionand a further coup d'état, and in 2004, thousands of US troops again invadedHaiti (just as they first did back in 1915) in order to 'restore stability andsecurity' to their 'troubled island neighbour.' An expensive andlong-term UN 'stabilisation mission' staffed by 9,000 heavily armed troops soontook over the job of helping to pacify the population and criminalise theresistance. By the end of 2006, thousands more Aristide supporters hadbeen killed.
Over the course of 2009, a suitably stabilised Haitian government agreed to persevere with theprivatisation of the country's remaining public assets,5 veto a proposal to increase minimum wagesto $5 a day, and to bar Fanmi Lavalas (and several other political parties)from participating in the next round of legislative elections.
When it comes to providing stability, today's UN troops are clearly a big improvement over theold indigenous alternative. If things get so unstable that even theground begins to shake, however, there's still nothing that can beat theworld's leading provider of peace and security.
III
In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake that struck on 12 January 2010, it might haveseemed hard to counter arguments in favour of allowing the US military, withits 'unrivalled logistical capability', to take de facto control of such amassive relief operation. Weary of bad press in Iraq and Afghanistan, UScommanders also seemed glad of this unexpected opportunity to rebrand theirarmed forces as angels of mercy. As usual, the Haitian government wasinstructed to be grateful for whatever help it could get.
That was before US commanders actively began -- the day after the earthquake struck -- todivert aid away from the disaster zone.
As soon as the US air force took control of Haitian airspace, on Wednesday 13 January, theyexplicitly prioritised military over humanitarian flights. Although mostreports from Port-au-Prince emphasised remarkable levels of patience and solidarityon the streets, US commanders made fears of popular unrest and insecurity theirnumber one concern. Their first priority was to avoid what the US AirForce Special Command Public Affairs spokesman (Ty Foster) called another'Somalia effort'6 -- which is to say, presumably, asituation in which a humiliated US army might once again risk losing militarycontrol of a 'humanitarian' mission.
As many observers predicted, however, the determination of US commanders to forestall this riskby privileging guns and soldiers over doctors and food has only succeeded inhelping to provoke a few occasional bursts of the very unrest they set out tocontain. In order to amass a sufficiently large amount of soldiers andmilitary equipment 'on the ground', the US Air Force diverted plane after planepacked with emergency supplies away from Port-au-Prince. Among manyothers, World Food Program flights were turned away by US commanders onThursday and Friday, the New York Times reported, 'so that theUnited States could land troops and equipment, and lift Americans and otherforeigners to safety.'7
Many similar flights met a similar fate, right through to the end of the week. Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) alone has so far had towatch at least five planeloads of its medical supplies be turned away.8 On Saturday 16 January, forinstance, 'despite guarantees given by the United Nations and the US DefenseDepartment, an MSF cargo plane carrying an inflatable surgical hospital wasblocked from landing in Port-au-Prince and was re-routed to Samana, inDominican Republic', delaying its arrival by an additional 24 hours.9 Late on Monday 18 January, MSF 'complained that one of its cargo planes carrying12 tonnes of medical equipment had been turned away three times fromPort-au-Prince airport since Sunday,' despite receiving 'repeated assurancesthey could land.' By that stage one group of MSF doctors in Port-au-Princehad been 'forced to buy a saw in the market to continue the amputations' uponwhich the lives of their patients depended.10
While US commanders set about restoring security by assembling a force of some 14,000Marines, residents in some less secure parts of Port-au-Prince soon started torun out of food and water. On 20 January people sleeping in one of thelargest and most easily accessed of the many temporary refugee camps in centralPort-au-Prince (in Champs Mars) told writer Tim Schwartz, author of the 2008book Travesty in Haiti, that 'no relief has arrived; it isall being delivered on other side of town, by the US embassy.'11 Telesur reporter Reed Lindsayconfirmed on 20 January, a full eight days after the quake, that theimpoverished south-western Port-au-Prince suburb closest to the earthquake'sepicentre, Carrefour, still hadn't received any food, aid or medical help.12
The BBC's Mark Doyle found the same thing in an eastern (and less badly affected)suburb. 'Their houses are destroyed, they have no running water, foodprices have doubled, and they haven't seen a single government official orforeign aid worker since the earthquake struck.' Overall, Doyle observed,'the international response has been quite pathetic. Some of the aidagencies are working very hard, but there are two ways of reporting this kindof thing. One is to hang around with the aid agencies and hang aroundwith the American spokespeople at the airport, and you'll hear all sorts ofstories about what's happening. Another way is to drive almost at randomwith ordinary people and go and see what's happening in ordinary places.In virtually every area I've driven to, ordinary people say that I wasthe first foreigner that they'd met.'13
Only a full week after the earthquake did emergency food supplies even begin the slow journeyfrom the heavily guarded airport to fourteen 'secure distribution points' invarious parts of the city.14 By that stage, tens of thousands ofPort-au-Prince residents had finally come to the conclusion that no aid wouldbe forthcoming, and began to abandon the capital for villages in thecountryside.
On Sunday 17 January, Al-Jazeera's correspondent summarised what many other journalists hadbeen saying all week. 'Most Haitians have seen little humanitarian aid sofar. What they have seen is guns, and lots of them. Armouredpersonnel carriers cruise the streets' and 'inside the well-guarded perimeter[of the airport], the US has taken control. It looks more like the GreenZone in Baghdad than a centre for aid distribution.'15 Late on the same day, the World Food Programme's air logistics officer Jarry Emmanuel confirmed that most ofthe 200 flights going in and out of the airport each day were still beingreserved for the US military: 'their priorities are to secure the country.Ours are to feed.'16 By Monday 18 January, no matterhow many US embassy or military spokesman insisted that 'we are here to help'rather than invade, governments as different as those of France and Venezuela hadbegun to accuse the US of effectively 'occupying' the country.17
IV
The US decision to privilege military over humanitarian traffic at the airport sealed the fateof many thousands of people abandoned in the rubble of lower Port-au-Prince andLéogane. In countries all over the world, search and rescue teams were readyto leave for Haiti within 12 hours of the disaster. Only a few were ableto arrive without fatal delays -- mainly teams, like those from Venezuela,Iceland and China, who managed to land while Haitian staff still retainedcontrol of their airport. Some subsequent arrivals, including a team fromthe UK, were prevented from landing with their heavy lending equipment.Others, like Canada's several Heavy Urban Search Rescue Teams, wereimmediately readied but never sent -- the teams were told to stand down, theCanadian Foreign Affairs Minister Lawrence Cannon eventually explained, because'the government had opted to send Canadian Armed Forces instead.'18
USAID announced on 19 January that international search and rescue teams, over the course ofthe first full week after the disaster, had managed to save a grand total of 70people.19 The majority of these people wererescued in quite specific locations and circumstances. 'Search-and-rescue operations', observed the Washington Post on 18 January, 'havebeen intensely focused on buildings with international aid workers, such as thecrushed U.N. headquarters, and on large hotels with international clientele.'20 Tim Schwartz spent much of thefirst post-quake week as a translator with rescue workers, and was struck bythe fact that most of their work was confined to places -- the UN's hotelChristophe, the Montana Hotel, the Caribe supermarket -- that were not onlyfrequented by foreigners but that could be snugly enclosed within 'secureperimeters.' Elsewhere, he observed, UN 'peacekeepers' did their best tomake sure that rescue workers treated onlooking crowds as a source of potentialdanger rather than assistance.21
Until the residents of devastated places like Léogane and Carrefour are somehow able toreassure foreign troops that they will feel 'secure' when visiting theirneighbourhoods, UN and US commanders clearly prefer to let them die on theirown.
Exactly the same logic has condemned yet more people to death in and around Port-au-Prince's hospitals. In one of the most illuminating reports yet filed from thecity, on 20 January Democracy Now's Amy Goodman spoke with Dr. Evan Lyon of Partners inHealth/Zanmi Lasante from the General Hospital, the most importantmedical centre in the whole country. Lyon acknowledged there was a needfor 'crowd control, so that the patients are not kept from having access', butinsisted that 'there's no insecurity [. . . ]. I don't know if you guyswere out late last night, but you can hear a pin drop in this city. It'sa peaceful place. There is no war. There is no crisis except thesuffering that's ongoing [. . . ]. The first thing that [your] listenersneed to understand is that there is no insecurity here. There has notbeen, and I expect there will not be.' On the contrary, Lyon explained,'this question of security and the rumours of security and the racism behindthe idea of security has been our major block to getting aid in. The USmilitary has promised us for several days to bring in machinery, but they'vebeen listening to this idea that things are insecure, and so we don't havesupplies.' As of 20 January, the hospital still hadn't received thesupplies and medicines needed to treat many hundreds of dying patients.'In terms of aid relief the response has been incredibly slow.There are teams of surgeons that have been sent to places that were,quote, "more secure," that have ten or twenty doctors and tenpatients. We have a thousand people on this campus who are triaged andready for surgery, but we only have four working operating rooms, withoutanaesthesia and without pain medications.'22
Almost by definition, in post-quake Haiti it seems that anyone or anything that cannot beenclosed in a 'secure perimeter' isn't worth saving.
In their occasional forays outside such perimeters, meanwhile, some Western journalistsseemed able to find plenty of reasons for retreating behind them. Luridstories of looting and gangs soon began to lend 'security experts' like theLondon-based Stuart Page23 an aura of apparent authority, when heexplained to the BBC's gullible 'security correspondent' Frank Gardner that'all the security gains made in Haiti in the last few years could now bereversed [. . . ]. The criminal gangs, totalling some 3,000, are going toexploit the current humanitarian crisis, to the maximum degree.'24
Another seasoned BBC correspondent, MattFrei, had a similar story to tell on 18 January, when he found a fewscavengers sifting through the remains of a central shopping district.'Looting is now the only industry here. Anything will do as aweapon. Everything is now run by rival armed groups of thugs.' IfHaiti is to avoid anarchy, Frei concluded, 'what may be needed is a full scalemilitary occupation.'25
Not even former US president (and former Haiti occupier) Bill Clinton was prepared to go thatfar. 'Actually', Clinton told Frei, 'when you think about people who havelost everything except what they're carrying on their backs, who not onlyhaven't eaten but probably haven't slept in four days, and when the sun goesdown it's totally dark and they spend all night long tripping over bodiesliving and dead, well, I think they've behaved quite well [. . . ]. Theyare astonishing people. How can they be so calm in the face of suchenormous loss of life and loved ones, and all the physical damage?'26
Reporters able to tell the difference between occasional and highly localised bursts of foragingand a full-scale 'descent into anarchy' made much the same point all week, asdid dozens of indignant Haitian correspondents. On 17 January, forinstance, Ciné Institute director David Belle tried to counter internationalmisrepresentation. 'I have been told that much US media coverage paints Haitias a tinderbox ready to explode. I'm told that lead stories in majormedia are of looting, violence and chaos. There could be nothing furtherfrom the truth. I have travelled the entire city daily since my arrival.The extent of the damage is absolutely staggering [but. . . ] NOT ONCEhave we witnessed a single act of aggression or violence [. . . ]. Acrippled city of two million awaits help, medicine, food and water. Mosthaven't received any. Haiti can be proud of its survivors. Theirdignity and decency in the face of this tragedy is itself staggering.'27
As anyone can see, however, dignity and decency are no substitute for security. Noamount of weapons will ever suffice to reassure those 'fortunate few' whosefortunes isolate them from the people they exploit. As far as the peoplethemselves are concerned, 'security is not the issue', explains Haiti Liberté'sKim Ives. 'We see throughout Haiti the population themselves organizingthemselves into popular committees to clean up, to pull out the bodies from therubble, to build refugee camps, to set up their security for the refugee camps.This is a population which is self-sufficient, and it has beenself-sufficient for many years.'28 But while the people who have lostwhat little they had have done their best to cope and regroup, the soldiers sentto 'restore order' treat them as potential combatants. 'It's just thesame way they reacted after Katrina', concludes Ives. 'The victims arewhat's scary. They're black people who, you know, had the only successfulslave revolution in history. What could be more threatening?'
'According to everyone I spoke with in the centre of the city', wrote Schwarz on 21 January,'the violence and gang stuff is pure BS.' The relentless obsession withsecurity, agrees Andy Kershaw, is clear proof of the fact that most foreignsoldiers and NGO workers 'haven't a clue about the country and its people.'29 True to form, within hours of theearthquake most of the panicked staff in the US embassy had already beenevacuated, and at least one prominent foreign contractor in the garment sector(the Canadian firm Gildan Activewear) announced that it would be shiftingproduction to alternative sewing facilities in neighbouring countries.30 The price to be paid for suchpriorities will not be evenly distributed. Up in the higher, wealthierand mostly undamaged parts of Pétionville everyone already knows that it's thelocal residents 'who through their government connections, trading companiesand interconnected family businesses' will once again pocket the lion's shareof international aid and reconstruction money.31
In order to help keep less well-connected families where they belong, meanwhile, the USDepartment of Homeland Security has taken 'unprecedented' emergency measures tosecure the homeland this past week. Operation 'VigilantSentry' will make efficient use of the large naval flotilla the US hasassembled around Port-au-Prince. 'As well as providing emergency suppliesand medical aid', notes The Daily Telegraph, 'the USS Carl Vinson,along with a ring of other navy and coast guard vessels, is acting as adeterrent to Haitians who might be driven to make the 681 mile sea crossing toMiami.' While Senegal's president Abdoulaye Wade offered 'voluntaryrepatriation to any Haitian that wants to return to [the land of] theirorigin', American officials confirmed that they would continue to apply theirlong-standing (and thoroughly illegal) policy with respect to all Haitianrefugees and asylum seekers -- to intercept and repatriate them automatically,regardless of the circumstances.32
Ever since the quake struck, the US Air Force has taken the additional precaution of flying aradio-transmitting cargo plane for five hours a day over large parts of thecountry, so as to broadcast a recorded message from Haiti's ambassador inWashington. 'Don't rush on boats to leave the country', the message says.'If you think you will reach the U. S. and all the doors will bewide open to you, that's not at all the case. They will intercept youright on the water and send you back home where you came from. ' Not evenlife-threatening injuries are enough to entitle Haitians to a different sort ofAmerican reception. When the dean of medicine at the University of Miamiarrived to help set up a field hospital by the airport in Port-au-Prince, hewas outraged to find that most seriously injured people in the city were beingdenied the visas they would need to be transferred to Florida for surgery andtreatment. As of 19 January the State Department had authorised a totalof 23 exceptions to its golden rule of immigration. 'It's beyond insane,'O'Neill complained. 'It's bureaucracy at its worst. '33
V
This is the fourth time the US has invaded Haiti since 1915. Although each invasionhas taken a different form and responded to a different pretext, all four havebeen expressly designed to restore 'stability' and 'security' to the island.Earthquake-prone Haiti must now be the most thoroughly stabilised countryin the world. Thousands more foreign security personnel are already ontheir way, to guard the teams of foreign reconstruction and privatisationconsultants who in the coming months are likely to usurp what remains ofHaitian sovereignty.
Perhaps some of these guards and consultants will help their elite clients achieve anotherlong-cherished dream: the restoration of Haiti's own little army. Andperhaps then, for a short while at least, the inexhaustible source of'instability' in Haiti – the ever-nagging threat of popular politicalparticipation and empowerment – may be securely buried in the rubble of itshistory.
Notes
4 Brian Concannon, "Lave Men, Siye Atè: Taking Human Rights Seriously," inMelinda Miles and Eugenia Charles, eds., Let Haiti LIVE: Unjust U.S.Policies Toward its Oldest Neighbor(Coconut Creek FL: Educa Vision, 2004),92.
6 BBC Radio 4 News, January 16, 2010, 22:00GMT.
7 Ginger Thompson and Damien Cave, "Officials Strain to Distribute Aid to Haiti as ViolenceRises," New York Times, January 17, 2010.
8 "Médecins Sans Frontières says its Plane Turned Away from U.S.-run Airport," Daily Telegraph, January 19, 2010.
9 "Doctors Without Borders Cargo Plane with Full Hospital and Staff Blocked from Landing in Port-au-Prince," January 18,2010.
11 Email from Tim Schwartz, January 20, 2010.
12 "No aid [in Carrefour]. In the morning at UN base they said they would distribute there,but it didn't happen" (Reed Lindsay, Honor and Respect FoundationNewsletter), January 20, 2010,http://www.hrfhaiti.org/earthquake/). Cf. Luis Felipe Lopez, "Town at Epicenter of Quake Stays inIsolation," The Miami Herald, January 17, 2010.
13 BBC Radio 4, News at Ten, January 18, 2010.
15 "Disputes Emerge over Haiti Aid Control," Al Jazeera, January 17, 2010.
16 Ginger Thompson and Damien Cave, "Officials Strain to Distribute Aid to Haiti as ViolenceRises," New York Times, January 17, 2010.
17 "Haiti Aid Agencies Warn: Chaotic and Confusing Relief Effort is Costing Lives," The Guardian, January 18, 2010.
18 Don Peat, "HUSAR Not up to Task, Feds Say: Search and Rescue Team Told to Stand Down," Toronto Sun, January 17, 2010.
20 William Booth, "Haiti's Elite Spared from Much of the Devastation," WashingtonPost, January 18, 2010.
21 Tim Schwarz, phone call with the author, January 18, 2010; cf. Tim Schwartz, "Isthis Anarchy? Outsiders Believe this Island Nation is a Land ofBandits. Blame the NGOs for the 'Looting,'"NOW Toronto,January 21, 2010.
22 "With Foreign Aid Still at a Trickle, Devastated Port-au-Prince General Hospital Struggles to Meet Overwhelming Need," DemocracyNow! January 20, 2010.
24 Gardner then explained that, with the police weakened by the quake, "Thousands ofescaped criminals have returned to areas they once terrorized, like the slumdistrict of Cité Soleil [. . .]. Unless the armed criminals arere-arrested, Haiti's security problems risk being every bit as bad as they werein 2004" (BBC Radio 4, Six O'clock News, January 18,2010). In fact, when some of these ex-prisoners tried to re-establishthemselves in Cité Soleil in the week after the quake, local residents promptlychased them out of the district on their own (see Ed Pilkington and Tom Phillips,"Haiti Escaped Prisoners Chased Out of NotoriousSlum," The Guardian, January 20, 2010; Tom Leonard, "Scenes of Devastation Outside Port-au-Prince 'EvenWorse,'" Daily Telegraph, January 21, 2010).
25 BBC television, Ten O'clock News, January 18, 2010.
26 BBC Radio 4, News at Ten, January 18, 2010. It sounds as if Clinton, in his role as UNspecial envoy to Haiti, may be learning a few things from his deputy -- ZanmiLasante's Dr. Paul Farmer.
27 David Belle, January 17, 2010.
28 "Journalist Kim Ives on How Western Domination Has Undermined Haiti's Ability to Recover from Natural Devastation," DemocracyNow! January 21, 2010. Ives illustrates the way such communityorganizations work with an example from the Delmas 33 neighborhood where he'sstaying. "A truckload of food came in in the middle of the nightunannounced. It could have been a melee. The local popularorganization was contacted. They immediately mobilized their members [. ..]. They lined up about 600 people who were staying on the soccer fieldbehind the [Matthew 25] house, which is also a hospital, and they distributedthe food in an orderly, equitable fashion. They were totally sufficient.They didn't need Marines. They didn't need the UN. [. . .]These are things that people can do for themselves and are doing forthemselves." Kershaw makes the same point: "This self-imposedblockade by bureaucracy is a scandal but could be easily overcome. TheNGOs and the military should recognize the hysteria over 'security' for what itis and make use of Haiti's best resource and its most efficient distributionnetwork: the Haitians themselves. Stop treating them as children.Or worse. Hand over to them immediately what they need at theairport. They will find the means to collect it. Fill up theirtrucks and cars with free fuel. Any further restriction on, and controlof, the supply of aid is not only patronizing but it is in that control andrestriction where any 'security issues' will really lurk. And it is theHaitians who best know where the aid is needed" (Andy Kershaw, "Stop Treating these People Like Savages," TheIndependent, January 21, 2010).
30 Ross Marowits, "Gildan Shifting T-shirt Production Outside Haiti toEnsure Adequate Supply," The Canadian Press, January13, 2010.
31 William Booth, "Haiti's Elite Spared from Much of the Devastation," WashingtonPost, January 18, 2010.
32 Bruno Waterfield, "U.S. Ships Blockade Coast to Thwart Exodus toAmerica," Daily Telegraph, January 19, 2010; "SenegalOffers Land to Haitians," BBC News January 17, 2010.
33 James C. McKinley Jr., "Homeless Haitians Told Not to Flee to UnitedStates," New York Times, January 19, 2010.
Peter Hallward is a Canadian political philosopher. He is currently aprofessor of Modern European Philosophy at Middlesex University. He isthe author of Damning the Flood. This article was firstpublished in Americas Program Report (under a Creative Commonslicense) and Haiti Analysis on 22 January 2010.
Comments
So much similarities to our NRC video conferencing. My grandchildren went to Haiti this past summer and they are doing fine. Pre-occupied with military instead of the listening or lending a hand with the suffering is the only intent by US military. They should try to care a little bit of the people that are Haitians, instead of creating reasons for enforcments. Just as I said to these judges, our children know all about enforcements, they can even describe the enforcers. Kaohi